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The colonial migrations of European settlers and the westward movement of American pioneers were expressions of the superior energy and the higher civilization of the West. The British settlers in Africa reminded him so forcefully of his "beloved westerners" that he felt entirely at home among them. Roosevelt, therefore, readily likened the conquest and control of the Philippines to the taming of the American Great Plains. He justified the wrestling of land from the barbarian Indians as a service to humanity and saw the American experiment in the far Pacific in a similar light. The American record in Minnesota and the Dakotas was not without mistakes nor would it be in the Philippines but, whatever the errors, Americans were justified in their conquests because civilization was advanced. This apologia for imperialism Roosevelt had first proposed in The Winning of the West. It mattered little whether the American whites had won the land by fair treaty or by force, or by a mixture of these methods, "so long as the land was won. It was all-important that it should be won, for the benefit of civilization and in the interests of mankind." To oppose such action as immoral or unjust argued a "warped, perverse, silly morality." Roosevelt maintained that conquest, even involving war and its barbarities, American over Indian, Boer over Zulu, Cossack over Tartar, and New Zealander over Maori had "laid deep the foundations for the future greatness" of mighty peoples.?0
In the conquest of vast stretches of the earth inhabited by backward peoples Roosevelt claimed a leading role for Americans and for himself, if possible, direct involvement. "The only job which I think I would really like to do," he told Maria Longworth Storer (Dec. 2, 1899) as the United States prepared to take up the administration of colonies, "is a job I shall not be offered, viz., the Governor-Generalship of the Philippines with a free hand. That would be a job worthwhile undertaking. ...." Shortly thereafter, he complained to his good friend, Henry Cabot Lodge, that the Vice-Presidency, were he nominated and elected, would cut him off from all chances of governing the Philippines, "a job emphatically worth doing." Less than two years later he became President and, thus, attained an unrivalled position for directing the civilizing of the Philippines. But the presidential eminence did not provide him with the sense of participation and accomplishment that would have been his as a great American proconsul. To the task of civilizing backward folk Theodore Roosevelt brought certain preconceptions which are the core of his imperialism. An enduring conviction that the white race was destined to spread its culture across the world was its first tenet. This white race, defined by European geography, the Christian religion, a cultural link with Greece and Rome, and a kinship of blood, fur- The greatest bequest of a civilized nation to barbarians in ancient or moder times was government under law, of which selfgovernment was the ultimate in evolution and in justice.23 For nationalities capable of self-government Roosevelt felt kinship, while a people given to chaos and banditry earned his contempt.24 Human progress required the more politically sophisticated races to rule people unable to govern themselves until they had sufficiently matured. Men must have government, and must govern themselves or submit to government from without. Should they, because of lawlessness, fickleness, folly, or self-indulgence refuse to rule themselves, then subjugation would be their lot. The only way to escape this dominion was to demonstrate a capacity for self-rule.25 Self-government could not be a gift; it had to be earned, unfolding from the capacities of the social body. It is no light task for a nation to achieve the temperamental qualities without which institutions of free government are but an empty mockery. Our people are now successfully governing themselves, because for more than a thousand years they have been slowly fitting themselves, sometimes consciously, sometimes unconsciously, toward this end. What has taken us thirty generations to achieve we can not expect to see another race accomplish out of hand, especially when large portions of that race start very As the self-governing Western powers fashioned their empires, democracy in some form, attenuated perhaps, would inevitably find its way into the colonies and into the thinking of the subject peoples anxious to use it to advance their burgeoning nationalisms. The resulting problems were difficult. The typical Western legislature was, as Roosevelt well knew, composed of members usually quite unfamiliar with conditions prevailing in Burma or Puerto Rico. Thus, there was little likelihood that it could devise the necessary colonial laws. Such imperialist irresponsibility might have been acceptable when the paramount interest was in exploiting colonial areas. That day had passed. But a subject people was almost certainly unprepared to govern itself and this condition was further complicated by the tendency of democratic politicians to indulge the fancies of native nationalist demands. Colonial administration must avoid exploitation and "mawkish sentimentality." Hoping that any general departure of Europeans from colonies was many decades distant he nevertheless recognized that dominion over many colonial areas was unlikely to be permanent. This judgment reveals a sturdy realism in Roosevelt's imperialism, for he argued that the overwhelming numbers of aborigines would eventually assimilate the white population, and that "men of our stock do not prosper in tropical climates."27 Roosevelt agreed that conquest usually meant the use of force. So long as conquest meant progress for mankind it was good. "It 26 Works, XVII, 128. Roosevelt also recognized the appeal of the western form of government. "The influence of European government principles is strikingly illustrated by the fact that admiration for them has broken down the iron barrier of Moslem conservatism so that their introduction has become a burning question in Turkey and Persia; while the very unrest, the importance of European or American control in India, Egypt or the Philippines, takes the form of demanding that the government be assimilated more closely to what it is in England or the United States." Ibid., pp. 113-114. On the same point Roosevelt wrote: "'Think of the peoples of Europe stumbling upward through the Dark Ages, doing much work in a wrong way, sometimes falling back, but ever coming forward again, forward, forward, forward, until our great civilization as we now know it was developed at last out of the struggles and failures and victories of millions of men who dared to do the world's work. ' Only the civilized nations could participate responsibly in international affairs.29 Backward races unable to maintain domestic order could not be expected to assist in the maintenance of international law. To think otherwise struck Roosevelt as "mere folly," "the silliest kind of silliness," "absolutely feebleminded on our part." To ask Mexico or Venezuela, for example, to guarantee the Monroe Doctrine was "like asking the Apaches or Utes to guarantee it."30 Perhaps the most striking evidence of the Rooseveltian faith in the influence of civilization is to be found in his conviction that war between civilized peoples might soon become extinct.
In his admiration for William Howard Taft and Leonard
. . . More and more civilized peoples are realizing the wicked folly of war and are attaining that condition of just and intelligent regard for the rights of others which will in the end, as we hope and believe, make worldwide peace possible."31 Thus, if any colonial people did achieve in a national form the industrial or military prosperity to compete with the Western Powers, the very process Roosevelt looked on American acquisition of the Philippines, and the attendant responsibility for civilizing a backward people as providential. Generally, he did not think of the economic advantages offered by the Islands. Americans would be helping their "brethren of the Philippine Islands so far forward on the path of self-government and orderly liberty that that beautiful archipelago shall become a center for civilization for all eastern Asia and the islands round about."33 Yet was this to be as easy as it might sound? Colonial administration should strive for the best interests of the colonial people. The best interests of the Filipinos required a period of preparation for self-government under American tutelage. This he explained to Andrew Carnegie (April 5, 1907).
In the Philippine Islands we are training a people in the difficult art of self-government. . . . We are doing this because we have acted in a spirit of genuine disinterestedness, of genuine and single-minded purpose to the benefit of the islanders -and I may add, in a spirit wholly untainted by that silly sentimentality which is often more dangerous to both the subject and the object than downright iniquity.
The critical task was to introduce the Filipinos to the art of self-rule without arousing the kind of virulent Aguinaldan nationalism that demanded the dangerously premature ouster of the United States.
The President had few reservations about using Army regulars against the Aguinaldan nationalists until the area was pacified sufficiently to permit the introduction of civil government. States. The American undertaking in the Philippines was at once more difficult and more satisfying than British efforts in the Malay Settlements or in Egypt. The United States aimed to ready the native inhabitants for self-rule; the British had not undertaken such a significant task for the Egyptian fellahin. Because the Philippines were inhabited by a folk of some Christian culture with an upper class partly European in stock, this political apprenticeship was both reasonable and necessary. Because the practice of democracy was the great American ideal it was imperative that the United States advance the cause of democracy wherever possible.40 In Roosevelt's thinking the ideals of democracy provided sound warrant for American imperialism.
A major step in the political schooling of the Filipinos was their participation in the civil service, that is, in the administration of the law. The lower ranks of the service should be as native as possible, as Roosevelt saw it, and in the upper echelons such commissioners, judges, and governors as were Filipino should have exactly the same share in the operation of government as their American colleagues. But to make certain that the increasingly native administration remained efficient Roosevelt advised constant supervision in order to eliminate undersirable personnel and to promote deserving public servants. All this was by way of preliminary to the "giant stride forward in testing their capacity for self-government": the first Filipino legislature. In it the natives would be making the laws under which they were to live and not simply carrying into effect the regulations of an imperialist state. That, in turn, could well evoke greater nationalist demand for complete freedom from American control, once the experimental process had begun. He was sensitive to this nationalist agitation to be free of leading strings, sure that the needs of the people during the early years of tutelage "were moral and industrial, not political." There was no necessity and some danger in cultivating a "patriotic national sentiment" since this might easily be confounded with rebel Aguinaldanism. Sober performance of duty was what was required of the Filipinos.41
How then was the United States to know when the Filipino people were truly ready for national independence. The test could not be a simple one to be determined by the calendar or by the loud demands of native politicians. To him the basis of judging a people's ability to rule was self-restraint and respect for law individually and collectively demonstrated. Freedom was the "substitution of self-restraint for external restraint.
[Thus] it can be used only by a people capable of self-restraint; and they alone can keep it, or are ethically entitled to use it." The Filipinos had to exhibit their understanding of this principle and maintain it practically for some years before they could qualify as a free people. Otherwise, if independent, they might allow the return of banditry and chaos at home and constitute a threat to the well-behaved nations. Duty had enjoined the Americans to establish a stable government in the Philippines and there persisted the duty to maintain the government until the natives were able to sustain it themselves. This line of argument dissolved to Roosevelt's satisfaction the proposition that a people was entitled to self-government before having demonstrated its capacity to use it wisely and restated in realistic terms the apology for United States imperialism.42
A great nation could not decline the challenge of its destiny. Roosevelt excoriated those Americans who were unwilling to assume a share of the white man's burden. In the Philippines it would have been easy to do nothing for the natives, and, in leaving the islands, to consign them to savagery. Instead, the United States must do the hard thing and attempt "to bring the Filipinos forward in the path of self-governing liberty." Not only was this important for the islanders themselves but it was the best way of promoting international peace. "Remember," he warned a Cincinnati audience in 1899, "that expansion is not only the handmaid of greatness, but above all the hand-maid of peace. The day when universal peace is possible can only come when the nations of the world have grown civilized. In some places this state of things can come about by expansion of the great orderly peace loving powers."43 Such a mandate to extend civilization and world peace in the Far East was imposed on the United States and required the retention of the Philippine Islands. 42 Dangers for the world lurked wherever ill-prepared people fumbled with self-government, as was illustrated in Haiti, Venezuela, Santo Domingo, Colombia, and Cuba. Writing in 1914 Roosevelt observed that democracy, "the highest ideal of government," "is an ideal for which only the highest races are fit." In the countries south of the United States more trouble had come from failure to recognize this fact than from all other causes put together. For example, the French Revolution enabled Haiti to become an absolute democracy, the first West Indian island to live under what was intended to be a free government. The results had amply shown that it would have been infinitely better for the Haitians to have suffered anything else, even years of slavery, than to have been handed a democratic form of government for which they simply were not fitted. If the Haitians were to learn self-restraint, respect for law, and civilization, they needed an apprenticeship such as the Filipinos were serving under the United States. The irregular behavior of Venezuela and Santo Domingo caused Roosevelt to affirm his belief that some nations were not ready to take up the responsibilities of freedom. Interference by the superior nations to police these countries was fully warranted. On July 12, 1901, he told his friend Speck von Sternburg: "If any South American state misbehaves toward any European country let the European country spank it." As President, Roosevelt defended American intervention in both countries. United States action not only meant the prevention of misery and chaos, but served to protect American national interests from the ambitions of other superior, expansive nations. This intervention was described by the President as an honest policy from which no gain was expected. As for United States pressure on Colombia during the Isthmian canal crisis Roosevelt defended his diplomatic war of nerves on the grounds that construction of a canal was in the interests of human progress. The "bandits of Bogota," "homicidal corruptionists," by their unprincipled efforts to delay or prevent the canal had given another warning of the dangers of independence for countries to whom the advancement of civilization was a matter of secondary importance.44
These views were the lessons of imperialistic adventures. Ear- lier, without this experience, Roosevelt had been enthusiastic for the unconditional independence of Cuba. After the destruction of the Maine he insisted that "the one possible solution of a permanent nature" for the Cuban affair was the independence of the island. "The sooner we make up our minds to this, the better," he wrote John Ellis Roosevelt (March 9, 1898) . But the removal of Spanish control left a power vacuum that the Cubans themselves were unable to fill. At first, Roosevelt appeared confident that America's part in Cuba's destiny was to adopt a hands-off policy. In a letter to Elihu Root published in The New York Tribune, May 21, 1904, he explained that the United States had driven out tyranny and had remained in Cuba until it had established civil order and laid the foundations of self-government and prosperity. But he shortly learned the lesson that the foundations of self-government and prosperity must be deeply laid and slowly aged. Revolutionary outbreaks in independent Cuba made Roosevelt realize that the Cubans there were unable to measure up to their newly acquired political responsibilities. Armed intervention by the United States followed in 1906. Even then the President did not favor annexation of the Island; "emphatically we do not want it," he exclaimed to George Otto Trevelyan. Nonetheless the Cubans had failed to govern themselves, the need for American direction and guidance remained, and "TR's" chagrin was considerable. He described himself to Henry White as "so angry with that infernal little Cuban republic that I would like to wipe its people off the face of the earth."45 But, after all, Cubans were not sprung from Anglo-Saxon stock and American guarantee for Cuban good behavior became another phase of our destiny as a great nation. In each of these episodes the failure of Central American peoples to achieve what Roosevelt considered a proper degree of political stability had given rise to remedial action by a superior state whose duty it was to promote the interests of civilization, if necessary, by the imperialistic methods of armed intervention and military occupation.
The distinctiveness of Roosevelt's view of the American imperialist mission is evident in his remarks on the imperial ventures of other nations, which were readily justified by the back- The faith Theodore Roosevelt placed in the conscience of the civilized nations as a guarantee of human progress was sorely tested in World War I. The spectacle of superior peoples engaged in an internecine struggle for nationalistic advantage also forced him to distinguish sharply between "self-determination" for superior and inferior races as part of a final determination of the meaning of imperialism. The distinction made was a logical reflection of what Roosevelt had said and done as a proponent of Western expansion. Europeans were to be given every opportunity to decide for themselves how they would be governed while backward peoples as yet unfit for independence must be governed from the outside.
To provide sufficient opportunity for Europeans to rule themselves, even though organized into the smallest of states, was the responsibility of the larger nations. It was "one of the great international duties" to insure that small, highly civilized, and well-behaved states like Belgium, Holland, Uruguay, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden be protected against oppression and conquests. They had played an honorable part in the development of civilization and their rights were to be respected on that account. The penalty the superior nation was certain to pay if it failed in its duty was most serious. "Barbarism, savagery and squalid obstruction" was the price of indifference. Because no international body existed to prevent or punish unjust aggression it evidently fell to the civilized nations to police the world. But Roosevelt continued to distinguish between conquest by France in Algiers, for example, and that of Germany in Belgium. 48 "In international matters to make believe that nations are equal when they are not equal is as productive of far-reaching harm as to make the same pretense about individuals in a community. Keir Hardie has attempted to insist that in Natal the native Kaffirs should be treated on a political equality to the argument that self-determination was right and proper for all peoples. He was committed to the conviction that "some nations are not fit for self-determination, that democracy within their limits is a sham and that their offenses against justice and right are such as to render interference by their more powerful and more civilized neighbors imperative." Bitterly critical of any one who failed to make the same distinction he described such people as having "consciences of separate, water-tight compart- The span of Theodore Roosevelt's imperialist experience extended from the plains of the American west to the battlefields of Europe, coinciding with the years when Western control of the world's backward regions was at flood-tide. Conquests of large areas of Africa and Asia which had struck him as "natural," marked a rivalry that ended in a general war menacing many of his most cherished values. At this point he drew back instinctively. As attracted as Roosevelt had been to the tenet of the expansive superiority of the white race, his final judgment was characteristic of the man. Granting that his estimate of what constituted human progress was highly personalized and sometimes jaundiced, Roosevelt's dedication to the promotion of progress was more meaningful to him than the superior race thesis. His doctrine of imperialism was a stern one that included war, misery, and bloodshed, for Roosevelt was a stern and serious public man. It was a doctrine tempered however by a civilized heart, for Roosevelt accounted himself a civilized human being. The expansive quality of the Western peoples might well be the source and means of civilization. But it was the upward curve of progress that counted most to him.
